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ARGUMENT 
A careful reading of the plaintiff's brief and the 
defendant's brief show that there are numerous disputes regarding 
the interpretation of cases and the law. Most of the issues 
raised by the defendants, were addressed in the plaintiff's 
opening brief. Thus, in the interest of brevity, this brief will 
not readdress every issue raised by the defendant's brief. 
I. THIS COURT SHOULD HOLD THIS EXCULPATORY AGREEMENT INVALID AS 
A MATTER OF LAW. 
In its brief, the plaintiff asserted that the majority of 
states have held that exculpatory agreements are enforceable, but 
are subject to close scrutiny. The plaintiff also asserted that 
a minority of courts have held that exculpatory clauses are 
invalid as a matter of law. 
On pages 9 and 10 of its brief, and without any citation to 
authority, the defendant claims that no minority rule exists. 
Instead, all states, and the federal government, adhere to the 
majority rule. The commentators, and courts do not support such 
a proposition. Williston on Contracts states, 
"contracts enabling one to exculpate himself from 
liability for negligence or some other tort in which he 
has participated or will participate are at least 
strictly scrutinized and may well not be enforceable, 
though modern courts often view not only the 
exculpatory nature of such an agreement, but also the 
subject matter of the agreement, the nature of the 
conduct involved, and other factors, including the 
public or private nature of the endeavor and the 
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specificity of the language used, and whether it 
specifically mentions such words as "negligence," 
before declaring a particular agreement valid or 
invalid." 
Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts §12:2 (4th Ed. 1993). 
The tenth circuit has stated: 
11
 [m]uch has been said concerning the enforceability of 
so-called release-from-negligence contracts whereby one 
possessed of superior bargaining power is enabled to 
contract against liability for his own negligence. The 
federal view is that they are contrary to public 
policy, especially contracts affected with a public 
interest and involving the performance of a public 
duty.[citations omitted]. The general rule, however, 
seems to be that while private contracts of this type 
are not favorites of the law, they are enforceable 
provided they are made at arm's length without 
disparity of bargaining power, and the intent of the 
parties is manifestly plain and unequivocal, [citations 
omitted]." 
Titan Steel Corp. v. Walton, 365 F.2d 542 (10th Cir. 1966). 
42 C.J.S., Indemnity §8, states: 
"Agreements relieving one from one's own negligence are 
ordinarily contrary to public policy and invalid. 
Under other authority, it is not contrary to public 
policy for a party to contract for indemnification 
against its own negligence, particularly where the 
indemnity agreement does not defeat plaintiff's 
recovery...." 
Finally, the Utah Supreme Court has stated: 
"such covenants are sometimes declared invalid as being 
against public policy. However, this may depend upon 
the circumstances. The majority rule appears to be 
that in most situations, where such is the desire of 
the parties, and it is clearly understood and 
expressed, such a covenant will be upheld." 
Union Pacific Co. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 17 Utah.2d 255, 
259, 408 P.2d 910, 913-14 (1965). 
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Because Utah courts have never dealt with exculpatory 
agreements involving personal injuries, this case is a case of 
first impression in Utah. The plaintiff contends that this court 
should hold that such agreements are violative of public policy, 
and thus invalid as a matter of law. In the alternative, the 
plaintiff asks this court to hold that the exculpatory clause is 
not clear and unequivocal, and is thus unenforceable. 
II. UTAH LAW REQUIRES EXCULPATORY CLAUSES TO BE STRICTLY 
CONSTRUED. 
Utah law has long held that agreements that seek to relieve 
one's liability for his negligent acts are disfavored. Union 
Pacific R.R. Co. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 408 P.2d 910, 913 
(Utah 1965). According to the weight of authority, such 
agreements should be strictly construed. Freund v. Utah Power & 
Light Co., 793 P.2d 362, 370 (Utah 1990). Accordingly, a party 
can only shift the responsibility of paying for his own 
negligence to another when "that intention is 'clearly and 
unequivocally expressed.'" Id. at 370 (quoting Union Pacific at 
914). In the instant case, Respondent is using an exculpatory 
clause in the agreement to escape liability for negligence. The 
contract should be construed strictly against Respondent, and the 
court should limit its reading of the contract to the express 
meaning of the document. 
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III. FOR A RELEASE-FROM-NEGLIGENCE AGREEMENT TO BE VALID, 
NEGLIGENCE MUST BE EXPRESSLY STATED IN THE CONTRACT. 
When it is the desire of the parties to shield one of them 
from liability for their own negligence, the parties can agree to 
such a provision. Union Pacific at 914. However, to do so, the 
agreement must clearly express such an intention, without relying 
on "inference or implication from general language" in the 
contract. Id. at 914. In Union Pacific, a railroad company 
granted an easement along its railway to a gas company. The gas 
company was to lay a pipeline parallel to the track. In their 
contract, the railroad wanted an exculpatory clause releasing it 
from any liability for harm to the gas company's employees. The 
language used in the agreement required the gas company to hold 
the railroad harmless: "from and against any and all liability, 
loss, damage, claims . . . of whatsoever nature, . . . growing 
out of injury or harm to or death of persons . . . howsoever 
caused." Id. at 912. In holding this language insufficient to 
exculpate the railroad from injury caused to a gas company 
employee, the court said: 
"if it had been the intent of the parties that the 
defendant should indemnify the plaintiff even against 
the latter's negligent acts, it would have been easy 
enough to use that very language and to thus make that 
intent clear and unmistakable, which was not done 
here." 
Id. at 914. 
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Because the word "negligent" was not expressly used, the strict 
construction of the agreement demanded that negligence was not 
meant to be included. 
In the instant case, Respondent likewise seeks to avoid 
liability because of an exculpatory clause. In the clause, 
Respondent sought to insulate itself from a wide base of 
liability and used very general language in doing so. The 
agreement does not refer to negligence expressly, but instead 
asks Russ to hold it harmless against "any and all claims, 
damages, loss and expenses." Exhibit A to this Brief. Because 
the law requires this agreement to be strictly construed in favor 
of Russ, the overly broad language should make the agreement 
invalid. Respondent's intention to insulate itself from its 
negligent conduct is not expressly and clearly stated in the 
agreement, making it void for vagueness. 
IV. THE TREND LIMITING STRICT CONSTRUCTION APPLIES ONLY TO 
COMMERCIAL LEASES. 
A. The Russ/Woodside agreement was in a non-commercial 
context. 
Respondent argues that according to Freund, there is a trend 
to diminish the use of the strict construction rule in 
exculpatory clauses. Brief of Respondent at 6. Quoting Freund, 
they urge that an exculpating agreement no longer needs to refer 
specifically to negligence if the "language and the purposes of 
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the entire agreement" clearly imply an intention to indemnify. 
Brief of Respondent at 6. However, Freund only applies in a 
commercial context. Relying on Niagara Frontier Transportation 
Authority v. Tri-Delta Constr. Corp., 487 N.Y.S.2d 428, 430 
(1985), the Freund court held that the trend to relax the strict 
construction of these clauses applies when such agreements have 
been "negotiated at armfs length between . . . sophisticated 
business entities." Freund at 370. 
Respondent urges that the transaction between the Russes and 
Respondent falls within the rule in Freund, but fails to justify 
their conclusion that the Russes were a sophisticated commercial 
party. Brief of Respondent at 8. Resolving all inferences from 
admitted facts in favor of the party opposing summary judgment, 
Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-159 (1970), the 
Russes must be viewed as a non-commercial party, making Freund 
inapplicable. They were two private consumers buying a home from 
a large development company. Their contract with Respondent was 
to have a home, not a business, built and they paid up front for 
it (arguably an unsophisticated financial move). Their non-
commercial status is buttressed by the fact that the contract was 
signed in their own names, and not by or in behalf of a business 
entity. Since they do not meet the commercial status spoken of 
in Freund, the rule of strictly construing exculpatory 
agreements, as stated in Freund and Union Pacific, applies. 
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Respondent further argues that aside from Freund, Utah law 
enforces releases between private and commercial parties. Brief 
of Respondent at 8. They rely on Berube v. Fashion Centre, 771 
P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989). In Berube, an employee signed an 
agreement which released the employer from all claims and causes 
of action relating to a polygraph examination. Id. at 1039. 
While holding the contract valid as a matter of law, the court 
said that fl[w]e do not hold that plaintiff could not have raised 
legitimate claims challenging the release, [citation indicating 
unconscionable contracts are unenforceable omitted] . . . In this 
case, however, plaintiff does not challenge defendant's reliance 
upon the express terms of the release." Id. at 1040. Thus, the 
court did not hold that exculpatory agreements are valid between 
private and commercial parties based on the merits, but rather, 
held that the reason for the holding was plaintiff's failure to 
challenge the release. 
B
- Even if the Freund test applies in non-commercial 
contexts, the Russ/Woodside exculpatory agreement is void. 
Assuming, arguendo, that the Freund holding applies in non-
commercial contexts, the exculpatory clause in this case is still 
void. In Freund, that court held that an exculpatory agreement 
that did not mention negligence was still valid because the 
intent to do so was clearly implied from the surrounding 
circumstances. It gave four factors in its holding: (1) "the 
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breadth of the language employed/" (2) the extensive use of the 
word "liabilities" in the clause, (3) the contrast of the clause 
against exceptions to the clause in anther paragraph of the 
contract, and (4) the statement that "full and complete" 
indemnification is present. These factors are distinguishable 
from the case at bar. 
Petitioner concedes that the first factor elucidated in 
Freund is common to the Russ/Woodside agreement. Both agreements 
state that the indemnification covers "all and any claims" that 
may arise. Exhibit A to this brief. While this factor seems to 
cut against Respondent, since the broad language violates the 
strict construction rule and makes the boundaries of the 
agreement ambiguous, nonetheless, it is met. 
The use of the word "liabilities" was the next factor. The 
court seemed to say that using the word would make the clauses 
intent to cover negligence more clear. In the Russ/Woodside 
agreement, the word "liability" is never used. Exhibit A to this 
brief. 
The most distinguishable factor is number three. In the 
Freund agreement, the sentence after the exculpatory clause 
outlines the limit of the clause's scope. It says that there 
will be no indemnification for intentional conduct or willful 
negligence. Freund at 371. By exclusion, the inference is that 
negligence will be covered. This specific language puts the 
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reader on notice of what kind of conduct is covered. Without it, 
the reader is left to guess whether intentional conduct/gross 
negligence is meant to be covered or not. The Russ/Woodside 
agreement is void of any language of this kind. No other part of 
the agreement gives clarity to the exculpatory clause, which 
seeks to indemnify for all conduct that the law will allow. 
Exhibit A to this brief. That it refers to the "fullest extent 
permitted by law," Exhibit A to this brief, lends no clarity 
because the fullest extent of the law will depend on whether such 
agreements are valid. The reasoning is circular. 
The last factor is the use of the terms "full and complete" 
indemnification. This is meant to clarify the extent to which 
the party will be indemnified. Such language is again absent 
from the Russ/Woodside agreement. No other language contained in 
the clause clarifies the extent of exculpation. Since three of 
Freund1s factors in finding clarity in its exculpatory agreement 
are distinguishable from the Russ/Woodside agreement, Freund does 
not control the present case, even assuming it applies to non-
commercial agreements. 
V. PUBLIC POLICY DISFAVORS EXCULPATORY CLAUSES. 
Respondent argues that public policy does not support 
holding exculpatory clauses invalid. However, courts have been 
willing to strike down exculpatory clauses based on public 
policy. In Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp., 349 U.S. 85 (1955), 
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the owner of a towboat contracted to pull a barge up the 
Mississippi River. The contract specified that the towage was 
the sole risk of the barge owner. Id. at 86. During the tow, 
the barge crashed into a pier and sank. Id. at 86. The barge 
owner sued for negligence, but the tower rested upon an 
exculpatory clause, claiming to be relieved from all liability. 
After holding that exculpatory clauses among towers are invalid, 
the court went on to say: 
This rule is merely a particular application to the towage 
business of a general rule long used by courts and 
legislatures to prevent enforcement from release-from-
negligence contracts in many relationships such as bailors 
and bailees, employers and employees, public service 
companies and their customers. The two main reasons for the 
creation and application of the rule have been (1) to 
discourage negligence by making wrongdoers pay damages, and 
(2) to protect those in need of goods or services from being 
overreached by others who have power to drive hard bargains. 
Id. at 90-91. 
While this was dicta, it specified a policy-based analysis for 
striking down exculpatory agreements. The public interest in 
making wrongdoers pay damages, and thereby encouraging more care 
in their conduct toward others, was also urged in Union Pacific. 
In supporting the strict construction rule, the court said that 
to do otherwise "would tend to encourage carelessness." Union 
Pacific at 913. 
On pages 11-13 of its brief, the defendant states that a 
construction company is not a public servant and thus the public 
policy arguments do not apply. Plaintiff objects to this 
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argument on several grounds. First, the lists propounded by 
Tunkl and Krohnert are not exhaustive and should not be strictly 
adopted by this court. Instead, this court should consider those 
factors, and others, in determining the validity of an 
exculpatory contract. Second, general contractors are public 
servants and thus exculpatory clauses in construction contracts 
should be declared invalid as a matter of law. "Although under 
some authority, indemnity provisions in construction contracts 
are valid, under other authority, a construction contract which 
contains a clause which indemnifies or holds harmless another 
person for that other person's own negligence is against public 
policy and void." 42 C.J.S., Indemnity §8(b). 
Respondent intimates that the true public policy behind 
exculpatory clauses is to allow parties to allocate risk among 
themselves and their insurers. See, Brief of Respondent at 18. 
However, the exculpatory clause in this case made no mention of 
insurers. Reading the clause as it is written, it mentions 
nothing about reallocating the risk to another person. Instead, 
it simply strips Respondent of any responsibility. If the 
injured party has no insurance, they recover nothing. Thus, the 
policy of simply allocating the financial loss to a third party 
is not applicable here. 
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VI. THE BURDEN OF PROOF ARGUMENT WAS PROPERLY RAISED BY THE 
PLAINTIFF 
The defendant contends that the plaintiff did not properly 
raise the burden of proof argument in the lower court and is thus 
barred from raising that issue on appeal. That contention cannot 
be supported by reference to the trial court record. 
On page 4 of its memorandum in opposition to the defendant's 
motion for summary judgement, the plaintiff quoted from Union 
Pac. R.R. v. El Paso Nat. Gas Co., 17 Utah.2d 255, 408 P.2d 910, 
914 (1965). The quote reads, "the presumption is against any 
such intention . . . . It will be regarded as a binding 
contractual obligation only when that intention is clearly and 
unequivocally expressed." id. at 914. 
Additionally, the plaintiff briefed the lower court 
extensively on the issue of whether Mrs. Russ understood the 
exculpatory provision. Page 12 of the plaintiff's opposing 
memorandum states that Mr. Russ did not understand the 
defendant's interpretation of the contract term until the motion 
for summary judgement was filed. The plaintiff went on to 
explain that the contract terms were relegated to the middle of 
the contract and were not printed so as to draw attention to it. 
The plaintiff argued that this evidence showed that it is 
doubtful that Mrs. Russ understood the contractual provision. 
The intent of the parties was also raised on page 9 of the 
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opposing memorandum. Finally, on page 13 of the opposing 
memorandum, the plaintiff stated, "this court should take all of 
the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to Mr. 
Russ." 
Thus, the burden of proof argument was called to the 
attention of the trial court. 
Assuming, arguendo, that the burden of proof argument was 
not properly raised before the trial court, the defendant cannot 
now claim that it did not bear the burden of proof below. "Where 
a party has assumed the burden of proving a fact, he will not be 
heard to say for the first time on appeal that the burden of 
proof was on the other party." 4 C.J.S., Appeal & Error §241(f). 
In the defendant's memorandum in support of its motion for 
summary judgment, the defendant raised the issue of the 
decedentf s intent and argued that the decedent had intended to 
exculpate the defendant. Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment, pages 2. By raising that argument, the 
plaintiff assumed that it bore the burden of proof in showing 
that the decedent agreed to the agreement. That assumption was 
made by both parties in the subsequent pleadings. Therefore, the 
defendant cannot now argue that it did not bear the burden of 
proof on this matter. 
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CONCLUSION 
The contract provision invoked by the defendant attempts to 
exculpate the defendant from any responsibility for injury 
resulting to the plaintiff and his deceased wife for the 
defendant's negligence in maintaining the safety of a 
construction site. Because the contractual provision is 
exculpatory in nature, it is highly disfavored by the law. 
The public policy concerns, indicate that this court should 
hold that exculpatory clauses in construction contracts are 
invalid as a matter of law. Additionally, the language of this 
particular exculpatory clause is vague and ambiguous. Finally, 
the defendant has not carried its burden of proof because it has 
failed to show that the decedent agreed to the exculpatory 
provision. 
For the above reasons, Charles Russ respectfully requests 
this Court to reverse the trial court's decision to grant summary 
judgment in Respondent's favor. 
DATED this 21st day of April, 1995 
Abbott & Abbott 
Attorneys at Law 
by Nelson Abbott 
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ADDENDUM MB" 
AGREEMENT TO COMMENCE CONSTRUCTION 
Raits** of t t m e t t Monejuncf nemovajof Contingencies 
l/wit, (yliPl/tC ^ ^ / C ^ K Z ^ g ^ l ^ f l ^ ! , (h»falnaftar rtferrodjo aa jtaytr. whaler ona or mora) 
heroby Maae* loVjfpodeld* I fomas Co poratlon (hereinafter rslsrred to aa Woodslde) tha aom of I - / / t ? J — / n w ~ T , , l| 
(consisting of sLO / DftD Earnest Money Deposit previously receded by Woodeld* and an additional depoel\of l/Hfi *7^)Jj \ 
^consideration tor Wood side beginning eonatructkm onjhshome to be built on Lot _. ™-' o f -LJlf-nLtf 7n&Gm4r$\}fcb^ 
County of ^A^TZXJ\^ City ol £ / * m f > 7 / r ^ jJT<(t \ fr£f Utah. The** funds ara to Insure Woodaide that Buym will complete tha 
purchase of the home. Buy*r hereby remor«s efl contingencies and conditions precedent which may have boon specifically Hated In 
paragraph 15 of !h» Earnest Money Sal** Agreement for Residential Conatructfon ^nd paragraph 0 of Addendum "A" to tha Earnest Monay 
Salaa Agreement for ReakJenllnf Construction, respectively. 
In tha irrent Buyar tfoee not consummate tha purohane of the home within five business daya following completion of construction, as 
evidenced by a Final Inspection and Certificate of Occupanoy Issued by tha Clty/Counly of ^/jf-frA, 1 / / ~7. *7A / shall be 
retained by Woodilda *3 liquidated damnges. The foregoing sentence ahall not rentrtct nor limit any of tha rights Woodilda mBy have aa a 
rasult of Buyer's default hereunder, including tha tight to leek and obtain epeclflo performance. 
Woodslde hereby agrees to begin construction of the home and acreee that the funda aforem*ntk>n*d ahall be credited to Buyer as part of 
downpayment or closfng coats, It and only t^Buyer takes title to the home within the fhre business daya following final inspection aa outlined 
abort. 
Carripletltm Dab 
"Trie final completion date as contained In paragraph 6 (o) of the E«rn«*t Mon< 
4, Una one of Addendum "A" thereto Is hereby amended 
Thlo final completion date may be automatically extended 
tor* beyond Woadalde'a control for a period equal to the duration of euch interruption. 
Job Silo Vh!tl 
Tha construction site la a dangerous piece to Yltlt. Buyer agre»» to exerolee extreme caution If Buyer choose* to visit the efte, to limit the 
number of euch visits, and to ra(ra\n from allowing Buyer's or other chlidran to accompany Buyer on even visits. Buyer, to the ivU&st extent 
permitted by law, agrees to hold harmless Woodslde (Including Its nMIHfttee and subsidiaries and other contractore and subcontractors and 
their agents end employees; from any an* «u olalma. damages, lojs and expenses, Including but not limited to attomey'e lees, arising out of 
any deajh, accident, injury, or other occurrence reaultlng from visits to the job sue by Buyer or Buyer's family or other gueets. 
LoeMn 
Buy«r agrooe that any lock.in nl an Intereot rate with lender Is done entirely at his own risk and discretion, Buy*r agrees to hold harmless 
VVoodslde And any of Its ngonts or represenuUvee If final completion extends boyond any lock-In period that Buyer may negotiate with the 
Under. Any eailmale of a possible completion date celioited by Buyer for the purpose of ascertaining a lock-in period, arranging for the 
move, giving * landlord notice, or for any other purposo shall be and la understood by Buywr to be only an estimate and Shall not serve to 
modify the delivery provisions contained In the Earnest Money Salts Agreement lor Residential Construction or zoy addendum thereto. In-
cluding this addendum. 
Interest Rites 
Interest rates fluctuate on a daily basis. Buyer therefore acknowledges that the rate at closing may be higher,-lower, or the same aa that 
which la available at the time this document is executed. Buyer ecknowledges that any Information aoncrtad from Woodslda or thek-
sfofemenlloned affJlltttea c agenta concerning future Interest rate levels, points, or whether ft la prudent to lock-ln a rate la poreh/ opinion 
and Buyer hereby agree j to hold these parties harmless from any loss or action which may ooour from basing financial decisions on a'aid vpl* 
rtlons. 
Thla agreement ahall not restrict nor limit any of the rights either parXy may hat* by virtue of the Earnest Money 8alea Agreement lor Residen-
tial Conatructlon or any addenduma thereto which have been executed previously. 
Limitation on Warranties 
visions of paragraph 7 of Addendum "A** ara hereby Incorporated by referenoe Into thla document. 
Siltt Consultant oait r\ A * U K ' / ] 1 D * * f 
\ 
Buyer j 
FINAL ACCEPTANCE Tho foreoolnc Adflondurn "8" I j ^ r ^ F ^ en tnlt 
VOODCtDfi HOMrjt CORPORATTOj 
A. CP^eekrK3Wladg^tep4lpt of a flnaToopy of the torooolng Agreement bearing all eignaturot: 
N wcarrWWnt k(oMES CORPORATION SIGNATURE OF BUYER 
-*1«. 
TtTLI 
26 
